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STUDENT COMMENT
THE UNITED NATIONS DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION:

A

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
On April 12, 1974, the United Nations Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression' approved by consensus' and forwarded to the General Assembly a draft definition of aggression.'
After debate in the twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly
adopted the Committee's recommendations, also by consensus,' on
December 14, 1974. The adoption of this resolution marked the first
time that broad international agreement, albeit with some reservations, 5 had been reached concerning the meaning of aggression since
formal attempts at clarification under positive international law were
first undertaken by the League of Nations in the 1930's.6
It is the purpose of this essay to examine this recent definition
in the context of nation-state interaction as it exists today, and to
measure its efficacy by the degree to which it projects a realistic
understanding of this interaction process. In order to accomplish
these tasks this writer will examine the historical development of the
term "aggression," and analyze the functional role of the concept of
aggression within the existent international structure, in order that
a degree of shared understanding concerning the nature and signifi1. The relevant General Assembly directives to this Special Committee are contained in: G.A. Res. 2330, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967);
G.A. Res. 2420, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res.
2549, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2644, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2781, 26 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 29, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2967, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30,
at 116, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3105, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 143, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973).
2. On the significance of consensus within the confines of this definition see
Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 19, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/9619 [hereinafter cited as Report of the Special
Committee].
3. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2.
4. On consensus generally see D'Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAN. Y. B. Ir'L L. 104
(1970); Jessup, Silence Gives Consent, 3 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 46 (1973).
5. Especially prominent among those nations which sought to disassociate themselves from the definition was China. Their primary objection was that the definition
"still had serious loopholes and defects on key issues which might be used to justify
acts of aggression." Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 15, 1974, at 40 col. 1. In this regard
it is noteworthy that China was not represented on the Special Committee. For a list
of nations represented see Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 2.
6. A. THomrs & A. THoMAs, THE CONCEPT OF AGoGMssxoN 16 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as THomsl].
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cance of contemporary efforts to limit the use of force by States can
be fixed within a broad developmental context. The provisions of the
definition will then be scrutinized in light of this developmental context, and some preliminary observations concerning the lasting utility of this particularization will be offered.

I.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

For centuries man in his communal wisdom, has contemplated
the question of how States might be persuaded to limit the use of
force as an instrument for altering the fabric of international relations.7 A concept central to the proscriptive norms which evolved
from this contemplation has been the concept of aggression.' This
section will explore the broad contours of the historical development
of this term, focusing especially on those factors which have served
to transform "aggression" from a term which once denoted a rather
specific set of factual circumstances, to a concept which presently
incorporates such an expansive array of moral, legal, and political
connotations so as to be essentially devoid of conceptual clarity.
The etymological genesis of the word "aggression" has its foundation in the Latin verb aggredior, which originally meant to go to
or approach someone with any purpose, even a peaceful one." This
expression was later altered so that a hostile rather than a peaceful
purpose was indicated, but under both expressions the approach was
an open one rather than a secret, unexpected attack which was denoted by the verb adorior.'0
Even as this denotative essence was being concretized, however,
the philosophical antecedents of the term's moralistic connotations
were being formulated. Although some scholars have pointed to the
writings of the theological and canonical thinkers of the sixteenth
century as the earliest adhibition of "aggression" in an international
setting," the most nascent roots of its present moralistic content are
2
reflected in the contemplations of the ancient Greeks.
7. For a more extensive analysis of the development of the concept of impermissible coercion in international affairs than is possible here see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963) [hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE];
M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINRMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961)
[hereinafter cited as McDoUGAL & FELICIANO]; J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER (1958) [hereinafter cited as STONE]; THOMAS, supra note 6.
8. See STONE, supra note 7, at 1-26.

9. C. LEWIS & C.

SHORT,

A LATIN DICTIONARY 71 (1958) [hereinafter cited as LEwIs

& SHORT].

10. Id. at 57-65. This terminology was used almost exclusively in the context of
private criminal law and, as such, the ancillary concept of self-defense was closely
associated with the notion of aggression. When aggression was later used in an international setting this correlation was retained.
11. See STONE, supra note 7, at 15-16, n. 2.
12. See BEOWNLIE, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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These writings, manifesting the Grecian concern for the causes
of war, 3 outlined a philosophy which required that each belligerent
assert a "valid and sufficient justification," subjectively conceived,
for the necessity of resorting to war. 4 This notion was further refined
by Roman 5 and early Christian doctrine" until it was formalized as
the concept of "just war," most prominently articulated by St. Augustine, 7 St. Thomas Aquinas," and later by Hugo Grotius.1'
But the monolithic nature of the European world which generated these moralistic concerns was unable to endure, 1 and in the
scramble for political allegiance which characterized the Western
scene after Westphalia, 2 the concept of aggression was harnessed to
serve a more pragmatic function. Perpetuation of the nation-state
came to represent a value of pre-eminent importance in international
affairs, and "aggression" was used both as a propaganda tool to mold
internal cohesion and as a descriptive term in several agreements
which sought to insure the safety of the State against external disruption.2 Most significant for our purposes is the second function, which
manifested itself, primarily in the period of the nineteenth century,
in the promulgation of several treaties of defensive alliance.2
13. On the relationship between the ancient concept of war and the contemporary
notion of aggression see BROWNUE, supra note 7.
14. C. PHILLWSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ANCIEr GREECE AND
ROME ii (1911). For a compilation of other prominent works which portray this period
see BROWNLE, supra note 7, at 3 n.6.
15. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 4.
16. Id. at 5.
17. For a concise compilation of the most prominent works of St. Augustine on
the topic of "just war" see Id., at 5 n.3.
18. For a concise compilation of the most prominent works of Aquinas on this
subject see Id., at 6 n.3.
19. For a concise compilation of the works of Hugo Grotius on this subject see Id.,
at 13 n. 4.
20. The nature of the European world is here characterized as monolithic due to
the strong unifying influence of the Church; see generally F. CARLYLE & A. CARILYLE, A
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 1-127 (1922). The erosion of this
unity has been characterized by J. FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITrCAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON
TO GROTIUS 1414-1625 at 55 (2d ed., 1923) as: "a change from a world-empire to a
territorial State, and from ecclesiastical to civil predominance." The result was a shift
in the authority to wage and justify war from the Pope to the prince. On this topic
generally see T. LAWRENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-1 (7th ed., 1928); A. NuSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 4 (rev. ed., 1954); W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY OF MANKIND 27 (1954); L. STunzo, THE INTERNATIONAL CormmuNrrY AND THE
RIGHT OF WAR ch. 1 (1929).
21. More precisely the roots of this development can be attributed to the rise of
probabalism and the balance of power which predominated the Western world roughly
from 1500 to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), see BROWNmE, supra note 7, at 10-18.
22. BHOWNLE, supra note 7, at 14.

23. THoMAS, supra note 6, at 15.
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These agreements sought to describe, in rather specific terms,
the conjunction of factual circumstances which would invoke member reaction under the provisions of the various instruments. A concept central to the operation of these treaties was aggression, typically characterized as the first use of the military instrument by a
State against any member of the alliance."
These agreements, however, like the world order they represented, proved incapable of coping with the ever more sophisticated
technologies of nation-state interaction and the ever more pervasive
willingness of States to resort to the ultimate modalities of force. 5
The holocaust of World War I aptly depicted the inability of alliance
structures to discourage the resort to war. As a result of the hostilities,
the international community came to realize that some measure of
consensus was necessary on those levels of coercion which were impermissible as instruments of international change. The Covenant of the
League of Nations26 and Articles 231, 239, and 429 of the Treaty of
Versailles 27 represent the groundwork of this effort.
Unfortunately, the content of the prescriptions on aggression and
other limitations on the use of force by States defined within the
League framework were no better than nebulous. Aggression remained a term of amorphous composition, its adhibition being limited to a declaration that member nations bore a fundamental obligation to "respect and preserve against external aggression the terri2
torial integrity and existing political independence of all members."s
This statement clearly indicated that the territorial integrity and
political independence of a State were not to be breached through the
aggressive actions of another State. However, as time passed, it became equally apparent that aggression, being undefined within the
Covenant, was not a term of sufficiently definitive content for measuring State compliance or for proscribing State action. This inadequacy engendered a number of inconclusive attempts to more care24. THOMAs, supra note 6, at 15. The mechanistic nature of this procedure was
often modified, however, by interpretations which required that the use of armed force
be of substantial magnitude before member reaction would be justified.
25. Id. For a more detailed examination of this historical progression see
BROWNLE, supra note 7, at 1-18.
26. Conveniently found in H. BRIOGS, THE LAW oF NATIONS 1047-53 (1952).
27. Conveniently found in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. SutmP. 151 (1923).
28. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10. When it became apparent that the
prescriptions contained in Article 10 were too imprecise to measure compliance with
community perspectives concerning the use of force, the provisions of Article 12 became the primary standard for the determination of impermissible coercion. The prohibition of Article 12 constructed a lawful-unlawful dichotomization of coercion based
on compliance with certain specific procedures for the initiation or mandated termination of hostilities.
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fully delineate the extent of the prohibition and declare aggressive
war illicit.29 Representative of such attempts were several instruments, promulgated either under the auspices of the League or coextensive with its existence, such as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance,3 the Geneva Protocol of 1924, 31 the Treaty of Locarno,3 2 and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 3
While subsequent attempts to clarify the content of the prohibition, such as the General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (London Conference)" were a bit more fruitful,
the scourge of war once again exposed the frailties of the prevailing
international constraints.
When a degree of normalcy again prevailed in international affairs, a second effort to comprehensively delimit the use of force by
States under positive international law was initiated. At the convocations held preparatory to the formulation of the Charter of the United
Nations, a conscious decision was made to construct new international prescriptions concerning the use of force by States upon certain
technical legal concepts of broad historical and factual reference.,
However, the technical legal terminology contained in the
Charter did little more than restate the problem encountered within
the framework of the League of Nations,"0 so the search for consensus
concerning the content of the prohibition continued. Unfortunately,
the efforts of the International Law Commission,37 the First (Political)3" and the Sixth (Legal) Committees of the General Assembly, 9
29. See THOMAS, supra note 6, at 16-7.
30. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, LEAouE OF NATIONS OFF. J. Spec. Supp. 16,
Annex 10 (Pt. I), at 203-9 (1923). The proposed treaty was abandoned in 1924.
31. The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes is contained
in 2 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1378 (1933). The protocol was never ratified. For a discussion of its terms see H. MILLER, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL (1925).
32. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Locarno. The text is conveniently found in M.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1689 (1931).
33. Treaty for the Renunciation of War. The text is contained in M. HUDSON,
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

2522 (1931).

34. This text is conveniently found in Report of the Secretary General, 7 U.N.
GAOR Annex, Agenda Item 54, at 34-5, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952).
35. See McDOuGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 61 & n. 147; L. GOODRICH & E.
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DocuMENTS

263-6 (2d rev.

ed., 1949).
36. The historical problem has been to generate prescriptions which are sufficiently precise so as to measure State compliance, and to avoid terminology which
generates more questions than it resolves. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 7.
37. For a brief recapitulation of the activities of the International Law Commission relative to the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
see THOMAS supra note 6, at 23-8.
38. On the activities of the First Committee relative to this topic see Id. at 22-3
& n. 48.
39. On the proceedings of the Sixth Committee see Id. at 34 & n. 110.
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and the first three Special Committees on the Question of Defining
Aggression 0 were met with dissension and eventual failure. It was the
fourth Special Committee, after one hundred and thirteen meetings
encompassing more than seven years of arduous debate and delicate
compromise, which finally produced a reasonably balanced and sufficiently comprehensive' definition of aggression. 2
This, then, is the historical chronicle, a chronicle which comprises a plethora of rhetoric and authoritative myth. Against this
backdrop it would be simplistic to assume that such diversity is solely attributable to factors associated with the genesis and development of the concept of aggression. Clearly there are other factors at
work. The particularization of impermissible aggression in the context of nation-state interaction is now something more than an exercise in derivation and legal syntactics.'3 And the statement of this
reality exposes a truism clearly illuminated by these historical archives-that prescriptions or agreements on whatever level of generality reflect the world order from which they are derived, and their
efficacy depends on the extent to which they incorporate an adequate understanding of the dynamics of this order. The following
section will examine the content of this functional matrix as it presently exists.
II. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
In the classical literature of international affairs, the nature of
typical relations among States was depicted by a two-fold categorization-the state of war and the state of peace." When the inherent
inadequacies of this description became apparent, the theorem was
expanded to encompass a third mode of nation-state relations, that
mode being characterized as "measures short of war," 0 "a legal state
of intermediacy," 6 or certain other phrases of similar substance.'7 Yet
40. The most prominent efforts of these Committees are reflected in Report of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 11,
U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1954); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, 23 U.N. GAOR Agenda Item No. 86, U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1 (1967);
Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 24 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 20, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969); see generally THOMAS supra note 6, at 2844.
41. See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 15-6, 27, 28, 33-4.
42. Report of the Special Committee, supra, note 2.
43. McDoUGAL & FELICIANO supra note 7, at 10.
44. See H. GaoTms, DE JURE BELu Ac PACs 832 (Kelsey, trans. 1925); E. STOWELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 491 (1931).
45. Schwartzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 474 (1943).
46. Jessup, Should InternationalLaw Recognize an Intermediate Status Between
Peace and War, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954).
47. On "state of reprisals" see F. GROB, THE RELATiVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 124-40
(1949). On expressions such as "quasi-war," "partial war," "imperfect war," "partial
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it has been suggested that the contemporary nature of State interaction, especially as it applies to interstate coercion and the flow of
decisions about coercion,4" is even more complex than these expanded
propositions would indicate. 9
0
A. The Factual Process of Coercion"
In the context of international affairs today, nation-states seek
the fulfillment of their value goals" by subjecting each other to coercive practices of varying degrees of intensity. This process, which has
been denominated as the "factual process of coercion,"" can be economically described as "certain participantsapplying to each other
coercion of accelerating and decelerating intensity, for a whole spectrum of objectives by methods which include the employment of all
available instruments of policy, and under all the continually changing conditions of the world arena.""
1. Participants
Historically, the participants in the process of interstate' coercion have been described as the "attacking and target States and
their respective allies."" However, this delineation, to the extent that
it purports to be a comprehensive enumeration, must be recognized
as insufficient. In the past, effective decision-makers within participating States have been subjected to the international sanctioning
process," and officials of third States 7 commonly take part in the
process of coercion through the assertion of claims and counterclaims
concerning the lawfulness of various exercises of coercion.59 In addition, various "minor members of the international cast"" participate
in the world power process and hence in the process of international
hostilities" see 7 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1101-2 (1906); 3 F. WHAR333 (2d ed., 1887).
48. McDouGAL & FELicIANO, supra note 7, at 9-10.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 11-2.
51. The primary value goals of political institutions are described in H. LASSWELL
& A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIETY (1950).
52. McDoUGAL & FELIciNo, supra note 7, at 11.
53. McDoUGAL & FEmciANo, supra note 7, at 11-2.
54. The term "interstate" is here used to distinguish the present topic from coercive policies and practices which are primarily municipal. It is not designed to narrow
the range of participation to entities described in the prevailing myth as "States."
55. McDouGAL & FEUCLANO, supra note 7, at 12 & n. 27.
56. See The High Command Trial, 12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 6970 (1949) [hereinafter cited as War Crimes Reports].
57. This expression is meant to refer to States other than the "attacking and
target States and their respective allies."
58. McDouGAL & FELmIcNo, supra note 7, at 13.
TON, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

59. G.

SCHWARTZENSERGER,

POWER PoLrrcs 126-46 (2d rev. ed., 1951).
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coercion. 0 In all cases, the primary factor in determining the extent
of effective participation is the power of the entity to shape and
influence policy on both the municipal and international levels.6'
2. Objectives
The possible objectives of entities participating in the process of
coercion can be summarily explained in terms of a maximization
postulate: "any participant acts to maximize certain or all of its
values in relation to other participants in the world arena.""2
3. Methods
In brief outline, the methods by which participants engage each
other in coercion to effect the realization of their objectives include
all the contemporary instruments of policy, 3 employed in varying
combinations and sequences and with constantly changing-not simply dichotomous-degrees of intensity.6'
4. Conditions
The final element of the factual process of coercion refers to the
conditions of the world arena, or more precisely, the participants'
estimations of them.5 These conditions include all the variable
and interacting component factors of the global power process which
serve to mold the participants' appraisal of whether their objectives
can best be accomplished through coercion or through persuasion,
and the level and techniques of coercion or persuasion required. 6
As this process of interaction which has been described as the
factual process of coercion continues, "participants . . . assert
against each other many varying claims respecting the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the various coercive practices employed by or against
them, invoking in support of their respective claims both world pre60. McDoUGAL & FEuLc NO, supra note 7, at 13. However, States are presently,
and likely to remain over the near term, the primary participants in the process of
coercion. For that reason the term "States" is often used throughout this essay as a
shorthand expression for the entire range of possible participants. The use of the term
does not limit the applicability of the concept expressed to other possible participants.
61. Cf. War Crimes Reports, supra note 56.
62. McDOUGAL & FELicuNO supra note 7, at 14.
63. These instruments have traditionally been described as the diplomatic instrument, the ideological instrument, the economic instrument, and the military instrument. For a discussion of the nature of these various instruments see McDouGo. &
FELcICNO, supra note 7, at 27-36.
64. McDOUGAL & FELacNo, supra note 7, at 27. The relationship among these
factors of objectives, intensity, and results tends to be one of direct proportionality:
the more comprehensive the objective, the higher tend to be both the level of intensity
of coercion applied and the level of destruction of values within the target State.
McDouGAL & FEicL.ANo, supra note 7, at 33.
65. McDOUGAL & FELmANO, supra note 7, at 20.
66. Id.
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scriptions and world public opinion." '
B. The Decision-Making Process
It is the responsibility of certain decision-makers, recognized by
the world community as authoritative, to pass on the validity of these
claims. This evaluation is accomplished through a process of authoritative resolution which can be summarized as "certain decisionmakers seeking certain common objectives, under all the varying
conditions of the world arena, by the employment of certain methods
or procedures in the prescription and application of authoritative
community policy." 8
1. Decision-makers
In more specific terms, the spectrum of decision-makers authorized by the international community to resolve disputes concerning
the application of coercion includes, beyond the commonly acknowledged group of international governmental organizations and judges
of international courts and military and arbitral tribunals, officials
of various nation-states, whether participant or non-participant in a
particular coercive interaction.69
2. Objectives
The policy objectives of these several decision-makers are many
and complex and expressed in varying levels of generality. In summary reference, however, the primary objective of all participants can
be commodiously perceived as the prevention of alterations in the
existing distribution of values among participants by processes of
unilateral and unauthorized coercion and the promotion of value
changes and adjustments through processes of persuasion or
community-sanctioned coercion. 0
3. Conditions
The conditions under which authoritative decisions are taken
obviously include all those same variables which affect the process of
coercion.' Of special significance in the context of the prescription
and application of community policy, however, are the expectations
of probable effectiveness or compliance with the projected regulation.72 These expectations are based primarily on estimations of effective power available to support an application of policy and an estimation of the possible costs of making and enforcing the decision."
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 41.
See text accompanying note 65 supra.
See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 45-9.
Id.
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4. Methods of Prescriptionand Application
The methods by which the process of coercion is regulated include certain unique procedures through which decision-makers continually formulate, reformulate, and apply policy with respect to the
various major types of claims to initiate and exercise coercion or to
avoid direct participation in coercion." Of the several methods employed in this process," prescription" and application of prescriptions" are of special significance.
In general terms these contemporary prescriptions relative to the
issue of coercion across State boundaries project a set of complementary policies-one set outlining the nature and extent of impermissible uses of force,78 the other set declaring that the use of force is
lawful if employed in individual or collective self-defense" or pursuant to an authorization by the world community 0 or, implicitly, if
the use of force falls below the minimum levels of impermissible
force. 8'
5. Specific FunctionalPrerogativesof Primary Decision-Makers
As the primary decision-maker in the area of community control
of the use of force by States, the United Nations has declared one of
its principle functions to be: "to maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."82 "Primary
responsibility"83 for the implementation of these purposes is delegated to the Security Council by Article 24 of the Charter, with the
General Assembly assuming effective authority, under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution,' when the Security Council is veto-bound.
For the guidance of these decision-makers, and others who might
be called upon to resolve claims concerning the permissibility or impermissibility of various exercises of coercion, Article 39 propounds
a three-tiered categorization of each incident of impermissible coercion. While defying explicit particularization, the terminology
invoked-"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression" -conveys an impression of gradations of intensity which can at
74. Id. at 49-50.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 50-1.
77. Id. at 52-3.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
79. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
81. See McDouGoAi & FEuCIANO, supra note 7, at 127-9.
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.

83. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
84. Uniting for Peace Resolution, 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 20, at 10-2, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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least be arrayed in an elementary order of magnitude-a threat to the
peace comprising the least pervasive manifestations of impermissible
coercion; an act of aggression representing impermissible coercion
encompassing high levels of intensity.5
Beyond the particular terminology invoked, however, are several
other factors which have a significant impact on the way in which
community prescriptions concerning the use of force by States are
applied. For example the conditions under which the United Nations"6 has exercised or attempted to exercise these functions of peace
enforcement have usually been characterized by either overt military
hostilities or high or rising expectations of violence.87 The corresponding objectives of community intervention in these situations has generally been to avoid overt violence, or, if that stage has already been
8
reached, to effect its termination.
In contrast, on those occasions when judicial tribunals" have
been called upon to evaluate the permissibility of coercion, overt
hostilities have ordinarily ceased. Furthermore, the function of such
tribunals is not the enforcement of peace, but the assignment of
criminal responsibility." As such, the standards of proof and the
application and prescription of community policy is often much more
rigorous and formal in the latter context than it would be in the
former context of United Nations peace-keeping functions."
Finally, officials of nation-states are also confronted with the
necessity of rendering decisions concerning the lawfulness of coercion
in several different contexts. They must continually appraise the
degree of constraint exercised in the ordinary course of interaction
with other States, they often must appraise claims for assistance
under agreements for collective self-defense, and, most importantly,
in the context of the present definition, they must assess and decide
upon appropriate responses to any drastically accelerated coercion
applied against their primary institutions.2
85.

McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 161-2.
86. See text accompanying notes 71-3 supra. The use of the term "United Nations" in this context is exemplary rather than restrictive. See text accompanying note
69 supra.
87. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 162.
88. Id.
89. Included within this expression are municipal-type tribunals such as the
Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal and the Polish Supreme National Tribunal and
those tribunals of an international nature such as the International Military Tribunal
(the Nuremberg Court) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
McDOUGAL & F ELICILNO, supra note 7, at 163 & nn. 107-9.
90. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 163-7.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 166-7.
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This, then, is the setting of the effort by the General Assembly,
through the Special Committee, to achieve a consensual particularization of the nature of that most intense manifestation of impermissible coercion-aggression. As the immediately preceding discussion
has revealed, the multiplicity of function and context to which the
descriptive terms of Article 2(4) apply renders definition, in the sense
that that term connotes a syntactical reference possessing a substantial degree of specificity, impossible. The incisive remarks of McDougal and Feliciano are of some help in appreciating the sense in which
"definition" is used in the area of impermissible coercion:
For observers with full awareness of the factors realistically affecting
decision, the task of 'defining aggression' is not appropriately conceived
as one of searching for a precise, certain, and final verbal formula that
would abolish the discretion of decision-makers and dictate specific decisions. It is rather, in broad outline, that of presenting to the focus of
attention of the various officials who must reach a decision about the
lawfulness of coercion, the different variable factors and policies that, in
differing contexts and under community perspectives, rationally bear
upon their decisions; of indicating the interrelations of these factors and
policies in context; and, perhaps, of making some lower-order generalizations about the relative weighting of pertinent factors and policies in

different contexts .93
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEFINITION
OF AGGRESSION

The following particularization represents a mixed definitional
format"4 containing a Preamble 5 of ten paragraphs and eight substantive Articles. The purpose of the Preamble is to reaffirm and annex
to the definition those provisions of the Charter and other relevant
declarations of international law which are of significance in the delineation of the concept of aggression-among them being certain
fundamental purposes of the United Nations, the duties of States and
the powers of the Security Council and other relevant organs under
the Charter, the fundamental right of peoples to determine their own
destinies, and the provisions of the Declaration on Friendly Rela93. Id. at 151-2.
94. This definition is characterized as mixed in that it incorporates elements of
both the generic (abstract) and the enumerative types of definitions. For a general
discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of each see THOMAS, supra note 6, at 68; McDOUGAL & FELictANO, supra note 7, at 144-8.
95. The Preamble reads as follows:
The General Assembly,
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the
United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace,
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of
the Charter of the United Nations, shall determine the existence of any
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tions 5 The Preamble also condemns aggression as "the most serious
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force" and offers the hope and
belief that this formulation of basic principles for the guidance of
various decision-makers will hasten the inception of a world order in
which the most severe deprivations of values by the use of force can
be controlled.
In regard to the substantive Articles of the definition, they consist, in general terms, of a generic demarcation of the concept of
aggression, a functional explanation of the perceived role of the concept in the decision-making context, an enumeration of certain typical acts of aggression, a reaffirmation of the full powers of the Secuthreat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security,
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in order not to endanger international peace, security and justice,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this definition shall be interpreted
as in any way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with
respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations,
Considering also that, since aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, being fraught in the conditions
created by the existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with
the possible threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, aggression should be defined at the present stage,
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive
peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom, and independence,
or to disrupt territorial integrity,
Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall not be violated by
being the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State in contravention of the Charter,
and that it shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof,
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to
hsve the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the
determination of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures
to suppress them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and
lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim,
Believing that, although the question whether an act of aggression
has been committed must be considered in the light of all the circumstances of each particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic
principles as guidance for such determination,
Adopts the following definition:
96. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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rity Council under the Charter, and an indication of those circumstances in which the use of force is lawful.
A. Article 1-Generic Definition of Aggression
Article 1 declares that:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, or
in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
set out in this definition'"

It has been asserted that the protection of certain potential objects of interstate98 coercion represents the crucial first step in the
establishment of international norms for the creation of a world order
based on the nonviolent redistribution and adjustment of values
among nations." If it is assumed that this is an accurate assessment,
the fundamental endeavor in the delineation of community perspectives regarding the use of force by States then becomes one of clarifying the import and extent of those objects characterized as sacrosanct. In this Article the prohibited objects are encompassed within
the phrase "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" and coincide, to a substantial degree, with objects proscribed
by Article 2(4) of the Charter.'" In broad outline the content of this
phrase embraces those classical bases of power deemed essential to
the creation and perpetuation of the institutional abstraction referred
to as the nation-state." 1
More specifically, the impairment of "political independence"
refers to the institutional arrangements of authority and control
within the target State. 02 "Territorial integrity" indicates the extent
of the geographical resource base and the people located within that
area which are subject to the control of State officials."' 3
"Sovereignty" although not specifically included in the objects
specified by Article 2(4), was added to the enumeration in this definition at the insistence of the thirteen Powers. 04 Unlike the other technical terms, however, "sovereignty" is more appropriately conceived
97. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 11.
98. See supra note 56.
99. McDouoAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 123-4.
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 states: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
101. McDouGAL & FEICIANO, supra note 7, at 177.
102. Id.
103. Id. The concept of territorial integrity also encompasses territorial waters and
airspace. Ferencz, A ProposedDefinition of Aggression, 22 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 407, 417
& n. 24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ferencz].
104. Id. at 416.
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of as an attribute which attaches subsequent to rather than prior to
or coextensive with the creation of a nation-state. Its specific content
has been described in terms of the "supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power to govern." 'M
The phrase "or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations" is identical to the wording invoked in Article
2(4), but for the substitution of the word "Charter" where "Purposes"
had appeared.'10 This expression, at least in the Charter context, was
designed to emphasize the inclusive nature of the policy terminology
expressed and to insure that no loopholes were created.'"
Article 1 then goes on to specify that aggression is the use of
armed force against these protected objects. This declaration manifests the traditional view that an exercise of the military instrument
represents that modality of coercive force most eminently capable of
generating levels of intensity sufficient to affect objects, declared
sacred by community perspectives.' 8 But today the dangers implicit
in the use of overt military force in a world characterized by the
proliferation of basic energy weapons, has motivated States to
improve their capabilities for achieving highly intense coercion
through other instruments of policy.' 09
In light of this expanding diversity of coercive modality, the
crucial question for purposes of interpretation becomes whether the
terminology invoked in the present definition creates a uni-factor
test"0 which precludes a finding of aggression when modalities other
than armed force are employed. Based on the reaffirmations contained in the fourth preambular paragraph, in Article 2, and in Article 6, it is clear that the Special Committee did not intend to so
narrow the customary prerogatives of the various organs of the United
Nations.
The nature of these prerogatives is best reflected in the Charter
provisions concerning the use of force and the application of these
provisions in two specific contexts: (1) when the Security Council,
acting under Article 39, or the General Assembly, pursuant to its
105. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1568-9 (4th ed. 1951).
106. It has been asserted that this modification serves to incorporate the procedural as well as the substantive purposes of the Charter. Ferencz, supra note 103, at
416.
107. McDouGAL & FEucimo, supra note 7, at 178 & n. 140.
108. Id. at 190.
109. Id.
110. The term 'uni-factor' is employed as a shorthand referent to the question of
whether only the use of armed force can trigger the operation of this definition or
whether other modes of coercion may also generate intensities capable of destroying
basic State prerogatives and thus qualifying as an act of aggression.
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powers under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, is called upon to
recommend measures to maintain or restore peace; and (2) when a
State seeks to exercise its right to act in individual or collective selfdefense under Article 51."' As to the first context, sufficient authority
exists to state that neither the characterization of the particular coercion employed, nor the recommendation of action to be taken under
Articles 41 and 42 is anywhere made contingent on the modality of
the coercion applied."' The fundamental prohibition of the Charter
is, rather, the threat or the use of any force, not just armed force
against the "territorial or political independence of another State.""' 3
As to the nature of the right to individual and collective selfdefense and the relationship of these rights to the question of modality, contemporary myth is not as clear."' In the period prior to the
adoption of Article 51 the structure of traditional prescription required a showing of a "high degree of necessity"" 5 prior to a permissible characterization by the appropriate decision-maker that the coercive practice or practices in question were employed in legitimate
self-defense. This "necessity" was ascertained primarily through an
examination of the expectation structure of the claimant at the time
that the coercion, alleged to be in response to unlawful initiating
coercion, was applied."'
Against this background of traditional prescription, Article 51
declares that: "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs . . ." (emphasis added)." 7 At first blush the emphasized
phrase appears to be a declaration that self-defense is permissible
only in response to an armed attack, thus narrowing the ambit of
permissible self-defense. The records of the preparatory meetings
which culminated in the present wording, however, indicate a contrary purpose. These records reveal that the phrasing of Article 51
was designed not to narrow the scope of legitimate self-defense or
raise the required level of necessity, but to accomodate regional secu111. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 56-7.

112. Id. at 60 & n. 75.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Of course, the question still remains whether
any particular threat or use of force will be characterized by the Security Council under
Article 39 as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. However,
it is more provident to conceive of the process of Security Council decision-making as

primarily an evaluation of consequentiality rather than strictly an evaluation of the
amount of armed force employed. Armed force is merely an element of consequentiality
not consequentiality in and of itself. See McDOUGAL & FcIcmo, supra note 7, at 229.
114. For a brief recapitulation of the controversy see THoMAS, supra note 6, at 546.
115. See McDOUGAL & FEmiCimo, supra note 7, at 231 & nn. 242-4.
116. Id. at 200.
117. U.N. CHAm art. 51.
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rity organizations within the Charter scheme."' Furthermore, the fact
that the travaux preparatoiresof Article 2(4) contain the statement
that the traditional doctrine of self-defense was not to be abridged by
the Charter, but, rather, preserved and maintained," ' also lends support to this assertion. The conclusion seems, therefore, inescapable
that a uni-factor test of aggression based on the modality of the
coercion applied, is not, and never has been, a part of the customary
2
or codified prescriptions concerning the use of force by States.' 0
Finally, in describing the participants in the process of coercion,
the definition gives explicit recognition only to States. This delineation coincides with traditional doctrine under which States were declared to be the only "persons" capable of exercising rights and duties
under international law. But as this author has previously noted, the
array of possible participants in the process of coercion is not confined
to the narrow institutional abstraction of the State.'"' To a limited
extent, the Special Committee recognized the inadequacy of traditional doctrine in this area when it appended to Article 1 an explanatory note which stated:
In this definition the term "State"
(a) is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a
State is a member of the United Nations;
(b) includes the concept of a "group of States" where applicable.,"

B. Article 2-OperationalDefinition of Aggression
Article 2 declares that:
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may in conformity with the Charter conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of
sufficient gravity. 2 3

Article 2 represents a very delicately balanced compromise between those delegates who sought to attach primary significance to
the objective element (priority-first use-of armed force against
prohibited objects) and those who emphasized the subjective component (intent to violate prohibited objects) of each incident of inter118. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 235 & n. 257.
119. Id.
120. The appropriate role of modality in the decision making context can be most
beneficially conceived of as a prima facie indicator of the intensity of the coercion
employed and the concomitant destruction of values effected within the target State.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 229.
121. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
122. See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 9.
123. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 11.
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The principle of priority has been, at least since the promulgation of the 1933 Soviet draft definitions, 25 of substantial importance
in the characterization of impermissible coercion. Indeed a concept
of priority is implicit in prescriptions such as these which seek to
prohibit certain levels of coercion, while at the same time retaining
in the nation-state the right to respond with coercion to preserve
essential prerogatives. 26 Yet exclusive attention to the chronological
priority of some physical act divorced from the dynamics of attack
and response, ignores the relevance of several other factors of fundamental significance.'7 Furthermore, beyond requiring States to be
attacked before responding coercion would be justified, 2 ' a test of
aggression based on the first physical act in violation of community
norms suggests that it is possible to formulate a list which would be
comprehensive enough to anticipate and proscribe all acts of coercion
which could result in the destruction of values to a greater degree
than permitted under community prescriptions. The likelihood that
such a list could be created and maintained, in light of rapidly devel2
oping technologies of violence, seems rather remote.
Yet the countervailing focus on the intent to breach specific objects is also insufficient as an exclusive test. Participants seldom
declare that it is their intention to maximize their values by resort
to impermissible levels of coercion.2 0 The problem then becomes one
of ascertaining intent from those objective manifestations of intent
deemed by appropriate decision-makers as relevant.' 3' While the dif124. The Soviet Union was the primary proponent of the objective perspective-the six Powers emphasized the subjective element. Ferencz, supra note 103, at
423-4.
125. Conveniently found in STONE, supra note 7, at 34-6 & n. 37.
126. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 169-71.
127. Id. Some other relevant considerations are the inclusiveness or exclusiveness
of the values sought, the consequentiality of the coercive force employed, whether
values are being sought or conserved, and the intent of the attackers. McDourAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 180-3.
128. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 424.
129. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 7.
130. McDouGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 179-80.
131. Of obvious preliminary significance in ascertaining intent is the consequentiality of the objectives, considered in terms of the nature, scope, and relative importance (to all participants) of the values sought to be affected. Also of some aid in the
clarification of such intent is to differentiate between those participants seeking to
attack and acquire values held by other participants and those who seek to conserve
and maintain their own values against acquisition by opponents. Finally, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the objectives that move a participant to action may aid in
the appraisal of the lawfulness of the coercion-inclusive objects being those which
admit of widespread participation in the sharing of values; exclusive objects being
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ficulties implicit in such an endeavor are not insurmountable, such
exclusive attention to the subjective component needlessly obscures
the relevance of other factors' which could be of assistance in appreciating the totality of the interaction context.
The compromise reflected in the final formulation was made
possible largely through the efforts of the representative of Ghana.'3
In this formulation, preliminary significance is assigned to the "first
use of armed force . . . in contravention of the Charter," which raises
a presumption that an act of aggression has been committed. This
presumption is, however, subject to rebuttal by the Security Council
acting under the principles of exculpation outlined in the second
section of Article 2.
In attempting to interpret the meaning of the first section of
Article 2 it becomes immediately apparent that special significance
has, once again, been assigned to the dimension of modality-"armed
force . . . in contravention of the Charter" (emphasis added)-and,
once again, the possibility of committing an act of aggression through
the use of other instruments of policy must be articulated.
However, the articulation of this reality is not determinative of
all the issues raised by this section of the Article. The prohibition
outlined in Article 2 is quite clearly not a prohibition of the use of
force simpliciter. It is, rather, the prohibition of those exercises of
force which can also be characterized as (1) armed and (2) in contravention of the Charter. An examination of the historical record reveals
that the content of the phrase "in contravention of the Charter" is
no longer subject to principled dispute. It refers to any violation of
those objects, declared by the Charter as sacred, and subsumed under
the primary headings of territorial integrity and political independence. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force
against either of these objects, and, under Article 39, the authority
to characterize specific coercive incidents according to their severity
(as either a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression) and recommend appropriate community sanctions is conferred
upon the Security Council. Nowhere in the Charter is the functioning
of these mechanisms made contingent on the modality of the force
14
applied. 1
Since the functioning of these mechanisms does not rely upon the
those values over which the acting participant is seeking exclusive control. See

& FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 180-3.
132. See THOMAS, supra note 6, at 7.

McDOUGAL

133. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Summary Records of the One HundredSixth to One Hundred Tenth Meeting, 29 U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.134/S.R. 106 at 23 [hereinafter cited as Summary Records].
134. See THOMAS, supra note 6.
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modality of force applied, the question of why the Special Committee
saw fit to articulate but one mode of aggressive force (armed force)
then arises. In exploring this anomaly let us first suppose that the
wording of this Article had declared that the use of simple force in
contravention of the Charter had been the subject of the definition.
Clearly such a formulation would have greatly expanded the scope of
the prohibition-sanctioning its application to situations involving
nominal deprivations of fundamental values (threats to the peace) as
well as to the most severe of all deprivations of such values (acts of
aggression).
From this perspective it then becomes apparent that the dimension with which the Special Committee struggled in this context was
how to indicate that only the most severe deprivations of values and
the most intense applications of coercive force employed in contravention of the Charter were the subject matter of this definition. The
solution which the Committee seized upon was to add the adjective
'armed' to the phrase 'force in contravention of the Charter'.
The implicit dimension reflected in this compromise is the ever
present problem of achieving international consensus in a context
which has significant political implications. On an abstract basis it
is quite apparent that the diplomatic, ideological, and economic, as
well as the military instrument hold a destructive potential sufficient
to affect "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence." However, political decision-making in this or any context does
not take place in a vacuum, and agreement among nations on the
precise conjunction of factual circumstance deemed to be sufficient
to raise a presumption of aggression beyond a recognition of the traditional concept of armed force is clearly not possible within the present
international structure. For that reason armed force, as the traditional manifestation of "aggression," served as a point upon which all
parties could agree. Those manifestations of force accomplished
through use of other instruments were not as amenable to agreement
and were denied explicit articulation. However, it is quite apparent
that it is not only armed force which can be aggression, but force
generated through any means which portends deprivations of values
of a most fundamental nature within the target State, irrespective of
the modality of that force. For that reason, in subsequent encounters,
the words 'armed force' should be viewed as an attempt of the Special
Committee to limit the concept of aggression to acts which portend
deprivations of values within the target State of the most fundamental nature, and not as a literal limitation of the concept to the narrow
35
verbal abstraction of 'armed force.1
135. This interpretation is in substantial accord with what Obradovic characterizes as a "gradual, progressive development of international law ... toward the elimi-
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The second major element of Article 2 is the reaffirmation of the
authority of the Security Council to rebut the presumption of aggression arising from the perpetration of an act of "armed force in contravention of the Charter." Although there was general agreement
among the delegates that the formulation of the present definition
did not prejudice the authority of the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations under the Charter, there was a considerable measure of discordant opinion expressed over the question of the
content of the exculpatory powers articulated in the second portion
of Article 2.136 The delegates were able to agree that if acts or the
consequences of acts were not of sufficient gravity, as determined by
the Security Council, such a conclusion would be sufficient to rebut
the presumption arising from the first use of armed force.' 37 However,
the content of the phrase "other relevant circumstances" remained a
matter of substantial controversy. Presumably the intent or purposes
of the participant who first initiated intensified coercion was within
the confines of the phrase.' 38 However, several delegations maintained, in rather absolute terms, that the intention or purpose of
State participation in the process of coercion was completely irrelevant. ' The result is that the Security Council is left then with little
additional guidance for the execution of its duty to vindicate participants from responsibility under certain circumstances.
C. Article 3-Acts Which Constitute Aggression
Article 3 endeavors to identify those physical acts which can now
be characterized as typical acts of aggression." 0 Within the confines
of the present definition, the purpose of this enumeration is to present
to the attention of decision-makers and participants in the coercion
process those acts, the commission of which will raise a presumption
that an act of aggression has occured, under the principles outlined
in Article 2. This enumeration is, of course, not an exclusive one"'
and the presumption which arises from the the perpetration of one
of the enumerated acts is subject to rebuttal by the Security Council
acting under the powers reserved to it in the second section of Article
2.
As to the wording of the introductory paragraph of Article 3,111
nation of all forms of pressure in the international community." PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA84 (1973).
136. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 19-21, 23, 31, 36, & 39.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 16, 23, 31, & 36.
139. Id. at 21, 26, & 39.
140. The purpose of the enumeration of specific acts in Article 3 was illustrative
rather than restrictive. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 20, 23-4 &
32.
141. See Article 4 of this definition infra at note 169.
142. The introductory paragraph reads as follows: "Any of the following acts,
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there was some disagreement within the Committee concerning the
phrase "qualify as an act of aggression," with some delegations expressing a preference for the phrase "constitute an act of aggression".' 3 Nevertheless, the foregoing phrase was adopted by the Committee and is perhaps more in keeping with the open-ended nature
of the definition as a whole.
The phrase "regardless of a declaration of war" depicts a recognition by the Committee that such declarations, although once regarded as a prime determinant of an aggressive act, are no longer
representative of the process of coercion in the modern world.'"
The Article then goes on to list the various examples of aggressive
acts which the Security Council might consider in the manner set
forth in Article 2 of the definition. The abstractions represented by
the terms invasion, bombardment, blockade, and attack on armed
forces have long been recognized by the international community as
classical acts of aggression.' The Special Committee gave early recognition to their salience and approved their inclusion in 1972.146
1. TerritorialInvasion or Attack '7
Subparagraph (a), in wording substantially parallel to the wording invoked in the 1933 Soviet drafts, recognizes the inviolability of
the territory of another State by invasion or attack. The subsequent
phrases encompassing the acts of "military occupation" and "annexation by force" were added in order to articulate the prohibited
nature of extensions of the concept of attack and invasion.
2. Bombardment'
General agreement on the wording of subparagraph (b) was
reached early in the deliberations of the Negotiating Group.'49 However some disagreement lingered over the question of whether the
phrase "any weapons" encompassed "nuclear, bacteriological and
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression."
143. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 15 & 17.
144. See Ferencz, supra note 103, at 417.
145. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It's Going, 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 491, 499 (1972).
146. Id. at 499.
147. Article 3 subparagraph (a) reads as follows: "The invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the
use of force of the territory of another State or party thereof,"
148. The prohibition of subparagraph (b) reads: "Bombardment by the armed
forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a
State against the territory of another State;"
149. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 418.
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chemical weapons"' 50 and "weapons of mass destruction."' 5' While it
seems apparent that the phrase "any weapons" is broad enough to
encompass both of these concepts, the Special Committee included
an explanatory note which stated that "the expression 'any weapons'
is used without making a distinction between conventional weapons,
weapons of mass destruction and any other kind of weapon.' 52
3. Blockade'
The formulation as finally adopted employed the wording proposed by the thirteen Powers. There was little disagreement on the
inclusion of the concept or the wording of the prescription.' 4
15
4. Attack on the Armed Forces of Another State 1
In subparagraph (d) the traditional formulation of the prohibition concerning attack on armed forces was expanded to include the
phrase "marine and air fleets." This expression was incorporated at
the insistence of the six Powers who asserted that these instrumentalities represented an important element of State sovereignty. 156 The
thirteen Powers, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the addition
of this element, and upon its inclusion declared that their rights to
"detain and impose penalties upon any foreign vessel or aircraft engaged in unlawful activities within its territorial waters and airspace"
were not prejudiced by this addition. 5
5. Extended Military Occupation'5
At the behest of the six Powers, the Special Committee undertook to consider the prohibited nature of a unilateral extension or
breach of an agreement which permitted a foreign military presence
within the confines of another State.'59 While there seemed to be
general assent among the delegates that such breach or extension
constituted an impermissible act of aggression, a prescription reflecting that existent level of concurrence was not included in the 1972
report of the Committee to the General Assembly. 6 ' Subsequently,
150. Id. at 419.

151. Id.
152. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 9.

153. Article 3 subparagraph (c) prohibits: "The blockade of the ports or coasts of
a State by the armed forces of another State;"
154. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 419.
155. Article 3 subparagraph (d) prohibits: "An attack by the armed forces of a
State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;"
156. Summary Records, supra note 135, at 42.
157. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 17 & 19.

158. Article 3 subparagraph (e) prohibits: "The use of armed forces of one State,
which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;"
159. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 429.
160. Id.
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more concrete agreement on the parameters of the concept and its
wording resulted in the prescription as it presently appears.
A number of commentators have criticized the inclusion of this
provision primarily based on the belief that the situations envisioned
by this formulation do not represent violations which occur with sufficient frequency or represent coercion of sufficient intensity so as to
warrant explicit prohibition.' Such an analysis is largely inapposite
and premature. The question, in the first instance, is not the frequency of occurrence or the projected consequentiality of particular
acts which is the sine qua non for characterization as an act of aggression. Rather the question is whether such breaches or extensions constitute violations of territorial integrity or political independence. If
they are, and the Special Committee has found them to be sufficiently representative of such violations, then the appropriate
decision-makers are confronted with a claim sufficient to raise a presumption of an act of aggression upon the perpetration of such a
breach or extension. At this point it is the duty of the decision-maker
to undertake an investigation of consequentiality and other relevant
factors, under the provisions of the second section of Article 2, in
order to determine the existence of facts which may rebut the presumpticn of aggression.
6. Indirect Aggression
Sections (f)6 2 and (g)113 represent acts of indirect aggression, the
prohibition of which was first proposed by the Soviet draft definition
in 1933. Since that time there has been increasing awareness that new
technologies of international coercion can be as destructive of essential nation-state institutions as can the more traditional modalities
of force." 4 One of the primary problems confronted in particularizing
the permissible-impermissible distinction in the area of indirect aggression is the close association between indirect aggression and selfdetermination. 6 5 Thus, the conceptual interrelationship between section (f) and section (g) and Article 7 in this definition is very close.
Section (f) articulates the distinct possibility in international
affairs that, in addition to the attacking state, other States could be
161. Id.
162. Article 3 subparagraph (f) prohibits: "The action of a State in allowing its
territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;"
163. Article 3 subparagraph (g) prohibits: "The sending by or on the behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or
its substantial involvement therein."
164. McDOUGAL & FELicNo, supra note 7, at 190-6.
165. See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 37 & 40.
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found in sufficient complicity so as to warrant the characterization
of more than one State as an aggressor. 66
In subparagraph (g) the inclusion of the phrase "armed bands"
was lauded by several delegations. 7 There was some disagreement
concerning the phrase "or its substantial involvement therein," with
some delegations claiming that substantiality permeated the entire
definition. 68 Substantiality, however, as it is used in other sections
of the definition refers to substantial interference with prohibited
objects. Substantiality in the present context refers to substantial
involvement with the sending of armed bands which in turn perpetrate a substantial use of force against sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence.
D. Article 4-Reaffirmation of Plenary Authority of Security
9
Council,"
Article 4 simply reaffirms the open-ended authority of the Security Council under Article 39 to find that certain acts beyond those
enumerated in Article 3 constitute, in any specific context of circumstances, aggression.
E. Article 5--Justificationfor and Consequences of Aggression
Article 5 deals generally with the justifications for aggression and
the consequences of aggression. The purpose of this Article is to incorporate certain other relevant considerations within the definition of
aggression without prejudicing the independent development of these
concepts. The wording of the first paragraph harkens back to the
1933 Soviet draft definition. The statement functions, in the context
of this definition, as a conceptual limitation on the broad powers of
exculpation possessed by the Security Council under the reaffirmations of the second section of Article 2. By negative inference, the
statement reaffirms the conclusion to be drawn from the Charter that
the only justification for the use of highly intense coercion in international affairs is to protect fundamental State prerogatives and institutions. 7 '
166. See Id. at 29.
167. See Id. at 30.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Article 4 states: "The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the
Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the proyisions of the Charter."
170. The first paragraph of Article 5 declares that: "No consideration of whatever
nature, whether political economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification
for aggression."
171. Paragraph one is also accompanied by an explanatory note which states that
"the Committee had in mind, in particular, the principle contained in the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations according to which
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The second paragraph of Article 5172 dealing with the consequences of aggression is framed in rather ambiguous language-an
ambiguity indicative of the continuing uncertainty and lack of consensus in the international community concerning the issues involved. The wording of the second paragraph is in general conformity
with the original thirteen Power draft which provided that armed
aggression constituted a crime against international peace giving rise
to international responsibility. "3 The obvious alteration of this formulation is the substitution of the word "war" where "armed aggression" formerly appeared.
This substitution was opposed by some delegations who felt that
the record of the Nuremburg Tribunals and the record reflected in
several General Assembly Resolutions provided sufficient precedent
to state that aggression constituted an international crime, not just
a war of aggression. Others stated that they would interpret the terms
as being coextensive. "'
The third paragraph of Article 5175 and the appended explanatory
note, which states that: "this paragraph should not be construed so
as to prejudice the established principles on international law relating to the inadmissibility of territorial acquisitions resulting from the
threat or use of force," posits an absolute denial of the fruits of aggression to the perpetrator of an aggressive act.'78
F. Article 6-Reaffirmation of the Right of Self-Defense "7
The avowed purpose of Articles 6 and 7 which follow is to reaffirm the present existence of the rights to self-defense and selfdetermination under international law, and is not intended to create
new rights.'78 Article 6 incorporates boiler plate language which reaffirms the principles of the Charter which sanction the use of force in
individual and collective self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter declares this right to be an inherent one which may be employed if an
"armed attack" occurs. Furthermore, this responsive coercion is a
temporary action to be undertaken only "until the Security Council
'No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State' ".
172. The second paragraph of Article 5 states that: "A war of aggression is a crime
against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility."
173. Ferencz, supra note 145, at 503.
174. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 26, 37 & 39.
175. The third paragraph of Article 5 states that: "No territorial acquisition or
special advantage resulting from aggression are or shall be recognized as lawful."
176. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 421-3.
177. Article 6 states that: "Nothing in this definition shall be construed as in any
way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful."
178. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 2, at 31.
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has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security," and is subject to subsequent analysis as to the legitimacy of its use. 79
The principles which serve as the primary focus of decisionmaking in the analysis of the legitimacy of an exercise of coercive
force claimed to be in self-defense are necessity and proportionality.
In an earlier section the parameters of 'necessity' were explored-that
'necessity' being defined by the extent to which the target State
realistically believed that responding coercion was necessary in order
to preserve its fundamental institutions.'80
Proportionality, on the other hand, is a shorthand referent to a
constellation of factors relevant to the increment of responding coercion necessary to defend essential State prerogatives. For present
purposes, proportionality can be conceived of as a requirement that
responding coercion be limited in intensity and magnitude to what
is reasonably necessary to promptly secure the permissible objectives
of self-defense. Coercion that is grossly in excess of what, in a particular context, may be reasonably required for conservation of values
against a particular attack, or that which is obviously irrelevant or
unrelated to this purpose, constitutes an unlawful initiation of coer8
cion.'
2
G. Article 7-Reaffirmation of the Right of Self-Determination
Article 7 serves to reassert the right of self-determination under
international law without precisely defining its scope. The importance and role of this Article in a definition of aggression is that it
focuses the attention of the decision-maker on certain other complementary prescriptions involved in reaching a balanced decision concerning a claim that aggression of an indirect nature has been committed. ' 3
179. See McDouoA & FELICIAO, supra note 7, at 232.
180. See text accompanying notes 114-6 supra.
181. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 243.

182. Article 7 states: "Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3, could
in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly peoples under colonial or racist regimes or other forms of alien domination;
nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support,
in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the abovementioned Declaration."

183. For an incisive exploration of the content of 'self-determination' under the
"Friendly Relations" Resolution see Note: Toward Self-Determination-A Reappraissal as Reflected in the Declarationon Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L L. 145 (1973).
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H. Article 8-Provisions of the Definition are Interrelated'
Finally, Article 8, which was taken from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, emphasizes the integrated nature of the definition in that the overall object is to balance factors related to impermissible uses of force with those prescriptions relating to the permissible uses of force. 8 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

The maintenance of public order, conceived of in its minimal
sense as community control and prevention of private violence, is
commonly and appropriately regarded as the first indispensible function of any system of law. 86 This realization has been accompanied
in recent years by an increasing awareness in the international community that efficient world institutions for the optimum creation and
distribution of values depends on the securing of some semblance of
minimum order.8 7 Subjecting the process of coercion and violence
among nation-states to effective community controls thus exists as
the fundamental contemporary problem for those who seek a public
order based on human freedom in value allocation.'
In a bygone era such community controls were reflected and
enforced through verbal formulas of rather limited historical and factual significance such as declaration of war, violation of boundaries,
failure to comply with a cease-fire order. Today the capabilities of
participants in the coercion process to destroy fundamental
institutions and prerogatives of target participants are infinitely more
sophisticated. Beyond that, the international community has come
to realize that simple word formulas are not capable of resolving the
animosities generated by value systems which posit antagonistic solutions to the ordering of human existence.
Yet within the constraints imposed by these realities the Special
Committee was able to produce an instrument aptly suited to the
flexible decision-making required in the regulation of the use of force
by States. But even more important than this very significant
achievement may be the implicit element which this definition reflects. That element is a willingness not often shown by the nations
of the world to compromise their antagonistic value systems in an
area where fundamental interests are at stake, in order that a broader
184. Article 8 states that: "In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other
provisions."
185. Ferencz, supra note 103, at 419.
186. McDouGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 121.
187. Id. at 122.
188. Id.
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base of shared expectations can be achieved. Perhaps the next step
forward in the creation of a world order based on a broad sharing of
values among all people will not be so long in coming.
Jeffrey A. Doose

